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1. Introduction 
George W. Bush linked the issues of aid and terrorism in a much cited speech in 
Monterrey given on March 22, 2002, where he said: “We fight against poverty because hope 
is an answer to terror” (cited in Krueger and Maleckova, 2003, p.119). This idea was echoed 
by various personalities from the U.S. administration, as well as from academia, who 
developed its implications for strengthening aid policy. This proposition attracted some 
severe criticism by Alan Krueger in an influential essay published in the New York Times 
(Krueger, 2003). The bottom line of this criticism is that survey data show that terrorists from 
different movements, including the Hezbollah, are predominantly recruited from a relatively 
wealthy and educated family background. Other pieces of evidence are also presented in 
Krueger and Maleckova (2003) as well as in Krueger and Laitin (2003) that lean in the same 
direction. Hence, the microeconomic evidence seems to refute a simple view that poverty 
breeds terrorism, at least as far as individual choice to participate is concerned. It suggests 
instead that wealth and education exert a positive influence on the decision to engage in 
terrorist attacks. This is used by some as an argument against the use of aid as a tool in the 
fight against terrorism, because it is supposed to reduce poverty and promote education, 
which thus seem to impact positively on terrorist activity. According to this view, then, aid 
to poor countries should be cut because it would increase the probability of terrorist attacks, 
by increasing the supply of better off and educated people. Therefore, this debate is bearing 
on a fundamental aspect of the relationships between the North and the South, and raises the 
issue of the continuation of foreign aid when the global fight against terrorism is dominating 
international relations. The present paper is aimed at contributing some light on this debate, 
using both theoretical and empirical analysis.  
The findings described above about the impact of wealth on terrorism also raise a 
major challenge to economists who want to apply rational choice theory to explain such a 
behavior. This is not just an academic issue, for if terrorism was definitely an irrational 
activity, then no serious thinking should be devoted at all to conceiving any type of policy 
against it. In particular, the issue of the impact of aid on terrorism should then be discarded 
as hopeless. The issue is that higher wealth and education increase the opportunity cost of 
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taking risk in perpetrating a terrorist attack, and still do not seem to act as a deterrent in the 
real world, at least for those who cross the line. Three main arguments have been offered to 
reconcile this finding with rationality. The first one is based on the assumption of rationing 
on the volunteers’ market. According to this view, there is an excess supply of volunteers for 
terrorist missions, and the organizations pick the most educated ones, likely to be more 
efficient than the others. Bueno de Mesquita (2003) has developed this line of analysis, with a 
model that endogenizes mobilization and violence. His model suggests that policies 
improving the economic situation, including may be foreign aid, could nevertheless play a 
favorable part for reducing mobilization and violence. A different argument is used by Azam 
(2005), assuming that terrorists are motivated by altruism towards the next generation. 
People with a lower rate of time preference will invest more resources in education, and will 
also be more willing to sacrifice their own life for the sake of the future generation. Hence, 
the effect of education on the opportunity cost of putting one’s life at risk might be offset by 
its positive impact on altruism. That model suggests that some types of aid policies might be 
effective against terrorism, depending on the effect that they have on the trade off facing the 
potential terrorists. Berman and Laitin (2003) and Wintrobe (2002) provide a third line of 
argument, and analyze instead the social pressure dimension of the decision to opt for 
suicide bombing. These models do not involve much implication for aid policy. However, 
the former addresses the issue of the relationship between wealth and terrorism described 
above, suggesting that some subtle indirect effect could yields a negative net effect. The latter 
three papers view suicide attacks as the ultimate test of the rational choice approach to 
terrorism. If the latter can be explained rationally, then any less radical terrorist behavior can 
be explained too. 
In September 2002, President Bush came up with a different line of defense for his 
views about poverty and terrorism. In a New York Times op-ed published on September 11 he 
wrote: “Poverty does not transform poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet, poverty, 
corruption and repression are a toxic combination in many societies, leading to weak 
governments that are unable to enforce order or patrol their borders and are vulnerable to 
terrorist networks and drug cartels” (cited in Krueger and Maleckova, 2003, p.140). This 
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statement identifies a crucial actor, whose behavior may create the link between economic 
conditions and terrorism, namely the government. However, his use of the expression “weak 
government” is somehow ambiguous, and might be misleading. In fact, Krueger and 
Maleckova (2003) and Krueger and Laitin (2003) find that repressive states are typical of the 
countries of origin of the perpetrators. Using a cross-country regression explaining the 
number of international terrorist events originating from each country over 1997-2002, they 
show that civil liberties have a negative impact on the supply of terrorist events. However, it 
is a difficult semantic issue whether civil liberties are secured by strong states, or by “weak 
governments”. One can make a convincing case that strong states don’t need repression, and 
are better equipped for securing civil liberties for their citizens. Then, the impact of civil 
liberties found by Krueger and Maleckova (2003) is in fact providing some support to George 
Bush’s view. However, one potential concern with these findings is the endogeneity issue. 
One could make a case that the countries from which a lot of terrorists originate are probably 
characterized by the presence of highly militant groups, which might in turn provide a 
favorable environment for the emergence of fairly repressive governments. Hence, the 
presence of a repressive government and the supply of terrorists might in fact result both 
from the same cause: a high level of militancy among some groups in the population. In 
other words, tougher governments emerge when there are tougher nuts to crack. 
Nevertheless, these results show convincingly that the issue of aid and terrorism cannot be 
settled without bringing in the government as a central actor. The present paper aims at 
clarifying the relationship between aid and terrorism from both a theoretical and an 
empirical points of view. It draws two lessons from the debate sketched above, namely that a 
careful analysis of the role of the government is needed for understanding the links between 
aid and terrorism, and that the issue of endogeneity is crucial for a proper empirical 
diagnosis. 
This is consistent to some extent with the theoretical literature on aid, which is largely 
couched in the framework of the principal-agent model, where the recipient government is 
regarded as the agent and the foreign power as the principal. There is now a sizable 
literature discussing various aspects of aid, which has percolated somewhat in the policy 
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debate (e.g. World Bank, 1998). The basic structure of the theoretical models of aid views the  
aid relationship in a contract-theoretic framework where the recipient government is an 
agent who is supposed to perform some tasks on behalf of a foreign power, the donor. Both 
players have some common interest, which is widely assumed to be poverty alleviation, 
albeit with different weights (Adam and O’Connell, 1999, Azam and Laffont, 2003, Svensson, 
2000 and 2003). Then, the aim of the analysis is to bring out the implementation problems to 
be solved in order for aid to be effective, by the donor’s standards. Hence, this theoretical 
framework could be used as well even if poverty alleviation was not assumed to be the true 
objective pursued by the foreign power.  Azam and Saadi-Sedik (2004) go one step further in 
the analysis by looking at the choice made by the foreign power between giving aid and 
imposing sanctions with a view to change the recipient government’s behavior. They 
provide a case study of the fate of the Iraqi Kurds after the “Provide Comfort” operation was 
launched, i.e. when this group benefited from some protection against Saddam Hussein’s 
persecution. They conclude that it was highly beneficial for this previously victimized group, 
who benefited from some economic growth under the military shield provided by the allied 
forces.  The model used in section 3 below is a very simple instance of this type of principal-
agent models, where the donor is using the recipient government as a delegate for 
performing some tasks on its behalf. Aid is thus viewed as an incentive for adopting a 
behavior more in line with the donor’s concerns. 
The empirical literature on the allocation of aid across developing countries has also 
adopted to some extent the restrictive view that aid should be mainly targeted at poverty 
alleviation. Nevertheless, it also takes on board some political economy dimension. Aid to 
developing countries has been increasingly delivered as program aid, conditional upon the 
recipient government undertaking various policy reforms. This approach is thus broadly 
consistent with the principal-agent framework sketched above. The highly influential paper 
by Burnside and Dollar (2000) has brought out forcefully that the effect of aid must be 
analyzed while taking due account of some heterogeneity among recipient countries. They 
favour an index of the quality of macroeconomic policies as their heterogeneity parameter. 
However, their results suggest that aid-effectiveness, as measured by its impact on growth 
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and development is probably not the crucial determinant of the allocation of aid across 
countries. Using also cross-country regression analysis, Svensson (1999) shows that aid is 
more effective in affecting growth in more democratic countries, but is not allocated to the 
latter more favourably. Hence, this “aid-ineffectiveness” literature is also suggesting that aid 
allocation is governed in the real world by other considerations than growth and poverty 
alleviation, which scholars have mainly emphasized. There is thus probably a hidden agenda 
beside the generous drive to alleviate poverty. 
This is the issue analyzed by Alesina and Dollar (2000), who show that colonial past 
and strategic alliances are the main determinants of the amount of aid received. However, 
they also show that, in the time series dimension, democratisation is often followed by 
increased aid, although there is no significant static effect of democracy. Mobutu’s Zaire is an 
example of a non democratic country which received aid continuously, for cold war-related 
reasons. Many oppressive dictatorships in Africa and Asia have received aid. This has 
changed somewhat recently, and General Abacha’s Nigeria, for example, was denied any aid 
for political reasons, after killing some representatives of the Ogoni people. The question 
arises whether giving aid to such dictators is legitimate, or whether the international 
community should reserve aid to ‘good governments’. However, denying aid systematically 
to oppressive regimes would exclude from the list of potential recipients a large fraction of 
the developing world, and thus does not seem feasible. By contrast, Berthélemy and Tichit 
(2004) find a significant positive impact of the Freedom House index of civil liberty and 
political right, in a panel data analysis covering the period 1980-1999, for 137 aid recipient 
countries, and 22 bilateral donors. This is confirmed in a later study, using a different 
estimation method (Berthélemy, 2004). Nevertheless, the latter two studies bring out quite 
strongly that most bilateral donors are also guided by their self-interest for allocating their 
aid, and in particular by their commercial relationships. The results reported by Fleck and 
Kilby (2004) suggest that the validity of such a diagnosis can be extended to the case of the 
World Bank, whose aid-allocation behaviour is significantly influenced by U.S. trading and 
political interests. Here again, however, one may wonder whether trading flows are perfectly 
exogenous, at least as far as bilateral donors are concerned. Although most of the latter have 
 6
formally ruled out tied aid, towards the end of that sample period, some implicit and subtle 
ways of tying aid remain probably in operation. Moreover, aid helps financing the trade 
deficit of developing countries, and this is bound to boost the imports from industrialized 
donors. Hence, some reverse causation between aid and trade might also be at work. 
Chauvet (2002) looks at the relationship between aid allocation across countries and 
socio-political instabilities. The latter refers to various events that reflect political problems in 
the recipient countries. She distinguishes: (i) elite instability, including coup d’etat, 
revolutions, and major government crises; (ii) violent instability, including political 
assassinations, guerrilla warfare, and civil wars; and (iii) social instability, including strikes, 
demonstrations and riots. She shows that these three types of events have different impacts 
on the allocation of aid, depending also on the kind of aid. Instabilities of types (i) and (ii) 
have a positive impact, while type (iii) has a negative one. This suggests that the aid flow is 
somewhat directed at governments that are under political threat, while it shies away from 
the threats that are directed more specifically at the economy. These results are again 
providing some support to a view where the donors are giving aid to recipient governments 
in response to some political motivation, rather as a simple contribution to international 
poverty alleviation.  
The present paper is also analyzing a political dimension of the allocation of aid 
across countries, by looking at its relationship with terrorism. However, we are not looking 
at the indirect link between aid and poverty, and then in turn to the additional link between 
poverty and terrorism, as done in the debate mentioned above, involving indirectly George 
Bush and Alan Krueger. We are instead looking here at the direct link between aid and 
terrorism, without explicit mention of the role played by poverty in the transmission 
mechanism. Section 2 discusses some empirical evidence, based on a similar data set to the 
one used by Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Krueger and Laitin (2003). We thus focus on 
the number of terrorist events per country of origin of the perpetrators. These data can be 
found on the internet, from the database provided by the International Policy Institute for 
Counter-Terrorism (ICT). We have extended their sample to cover the period from January 
1990 to March 2004. After a thorough search for robust correlation, we have found that the 
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amount of aid received by the country of origin is a statistically significant determinant of 
the number of terrorist attacks originating in any given country, with a positive impact, in a 
parsimonious cross-country equation. This is the empirical puzzle to which this paper is 
devoted. Section 3 offers a possible theoretical interpretation for these results. It sets up a 
simple principal-agent model, where the donor is giving aid in return for some effort made 
by the recipient government for fighting terrorism within its sphere of influence. As 
mentioned above, the model does not spell out whether poverty alleviation is a link in the 
chain between the government’s effort and its impact on the flow of terrorist attacks 
originating from its country. We keep an agnostic view on this, so that our channel of impact 
may be viewed as a black box. It is up to the recipient government to choose the most 
efficient policy tools for doing its job, and whether poverty alleviation should be part of the 
package is an open question. Nevertheless, “fighting poverty” is an important buzz word 
helping probably to attract the taxpayers’ support in donor countries, as shown by the 
Millenium movement. Then, aid money is probably quite fungible, and no earmarking to 
poverty alleviation could be a very tight constraint on the choice made by the recipient 
government (Feyzioglu et al., 1998). 
The comparative statics of this model shows that the amount of aid received and the 
supply of terrorist attacks may move jointly along a positively sloped locus, as the 
heterogeneity parameter called “militancy” changes, under some parameter restriction. This 
locus is akin to an Engel’s curve in the aid and attacks space. This result yields a testable 
prediction, namely that aid should be endogenous in the empirical equation presented in 
section 2. This is tested in section 4, which rejects the exogeneity assumption. This entails 
that the fight against terrorism does probably figure in the list of the interests of the donor’s 
country that recipient governments are supposed to protect in return for foreign aid. Of 
course, this paper does not claim that it is the unique motive for foreign aid, or that the 
traditional goals are just window dressing. The bottom line of this analysis is thus that we 
find a positive relation between aid and the supply of terrorist attacks not because aid has a 
pernicious influence, but because (i) aid has a beneficial influence against the supply of 
terrorist attacks, and, therefore (ii) donor countries are giving more aid to governments of 
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countries where more dangerous people come from. Section 5 presents an attempt at 
identifying the attacks supply curve by adding some dummy variables aimed at capturing 
some determinants of militancy. They do a reasonably decent job, as a negatively sloped 
relation is then found, providing some additional support to the theoretical framework.  
 
2. The Empirical Puzzle 
 The data are computed from a set of 1119 terrorist incidents, taking place between 
January 1990 and March 2004. These events are then aggregated over this period to produce 
a number of attacks originating from each country. Although 88 % of these events take place 
in the perpetrators’ own countries, they are all regarded as international attacks, because the 
nationality of the target is different. An analysis of the targets is beyond the scope of the 
present paper, but Krueger and Laitin (2003) and Delacroix (2004) contain some analysis of 
this information. During the period under study, 86 countries have produced terrorist 
attacks. The top twelve source countries are presented in table 1, while the complete set is 
given in appendix 1. 
 
Table 1: Top 12 Source Countries 
 
Country Number of Events Country Number of Events 
West Bank & Gaza 400 Algeria 47 
India 227 Pakistan 45 
Colombia 97 Angola 41 
Israel 58 Russian Federation 33 
Iraq 49 Spain 31 
Yemen 49 Turkey 28 
Source: ICT (http://www.ict.org.il). 
 
 These data can be used for the purpose at hand, namely analyzing the relationship 
between aid and the supply of terrorist attacks by the recipient country. The discussion in the 
introduction has suggested that it is worth distinguishing the effect of aid per se from the 
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effect of poverty or wealth. Table 2 presents the results from a series of direct estimations, 
adding a small number of explanatory variables for the sake of control. It presents three 
equations explaining the number of terrorist events originating from each country, estimated 
on a 178-country sample. This sample thus includes both developed and developing 
countries, as well as aid recipients and donors. The latter have a zero observation for ODA 
(Official Development Assistance). However, there are some examples of donor countries 
from which some terrorists came from, like France, Ireland, Spain, etc. Afghanistan, 
Azerbaijan, Cuba, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Myanmar, Somalia, Yugoslavia, as well as many 
small countries, are not included in the sample, because of missing data on GDP. The latter 
variable is used in some other equations below. Because the dependent variable is an integer 
count variable, with a quite large number of zeroes, such equations should not be estimated 
by OLS. The Negative Binomial regression technique was used instead (see e.g. Maddala, 
1983). However, for the sake of reference, the Poisson regression and the OLS one are also 
presented in the table. As both source and non-source countries are included in the sample, 
no selectivity problem should be expected. Equations 1 and 2 are yielding roughly the same 
picture, although they are estimated by a different integer count method. The former uses 
the Negative Binomial regression technique, while the latter is a Poisson regression. As the 
latter can be derived from the former by restricting one parameter, it is straightforward to 
perform a 2χ  test for comparing them, using the log-likelihood statistics. This test rejects the 
Poisson restriction by a wide margin.Equation 1 was also estimated on the enlarged sample 
obtained by including eight of the countries listed above, with the exception of North Korea. 
Another 2χ  test (with 8 degrees of freedom) rejected the assumption that there was any 
parameter instability across the two samples. Equation 3 is the OLS estimation of the same 
equation. The estimates are not widely different from the previous ones, as far as the 
coefficients are concerned. However, the attached t-statistics do not yield the same diagnosis 
as the z-statistics of the other two equations. Nevertheless, these equations suggest quite 
convincingly that there is a robust positive relationship between the number of terrorist 
events originating form each country and the amount of ODA that it receives.  
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Table 2: Number of Terrorist Events Originating from Country i 
 
 Equation 1   Equation 2   Equation 3   
Variables Coefficient z-Statistics p-value Coefficient z-Statistics p-value Coefficient t-Statistics p-value 
Intercept 0.61 4.14 0.000 1.42 37.42 0.000 1.54 0.48 0.64 
ODA 0.003 8.13 0.000 0.0008 16.86 0.000 0.009 1.23 0.23 
Population 0.013 3.98 0.000 0.009 19.69 0.000 0.18 2.15 0.03 
( )2Population - 1.52E-05 - 4.61 0.000 - 6.86E-06 - 17.48 0.000 -1.09E-04 -1.50 0.13 
Nb. Obs. 178   178   178   
2R  -   -   0.10   
Pseudo- 2R  0.13   0.20   -   
LR-Stat. (3 df) 148.67   1312.7   F-Stat: 6.49   
p-value 0.000   0.000   0.000   
Note: Equation 1 is a negative binomial regression estimated by quasi-maximum likelihood. Equation 2 is a Poisson regression, estimated by 
maximum likelihood. Equation 3 is a simple OLS regression. The dependent variable is the number of terrorist events originating from each 
country during the period 1990:01-2004:03. 
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Table 3: Number of Terrorist Events Originating from Country I (Cont.d) 
 
 Equation 4   Equation 5   Equation 6   
Variables Coefficient z-Statistics p-value Coefficient z-Statistics p-value Coefficient t-Statistics p-value 
Intercept 0.73 4.05 0.000 1.61 36.47 0.000 2.97 0.75 0.45 
ODA 0.0028 6.86 0.000 0.0006 11.86 0.000 0.007 0.87 0.39 
Population 0.013 4.14 0.000 0.009 19.75 0.000 0.09 2.24 0.03 
( )2Population - 1.54E-05 - 4.74 0.000 - 7.402E-06 - 17.53 0.000 - 1.02E-04 - 1.60 0.11 
GDP p.c. - 1.27E-05 - 1.12 0.260 - 3.07E-05 - 6.95 0.000 - 1.9E-04 - 0.64 0.52 
Nb. Obs. 178   178   178   
2R  -   -   0.10   
Pseudo- 2R  0.13   0.21   -   
LR-Stat. (4 df) 149.89   1371.56   F-Stat: 4.96   
p-value 0.000   0.000   0.001   
Note: Equation 4 is a negative binomial regression estimated by quasi-maximum likelihood. Equation 5 is a Poisson regression, estimated by 
maximum likelihood. Equation 6 is a simple OLS regression. The dependent variable is the number of terrorist events originating from each 
country during the period 1990:01-2004:03. 
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 In the first two equations, ODA comes out significantly positive, as announced above. 
Notice that, because population size is controlled for separately, ODA is included per 
country, and not per capita. Within the theoretical framework developed below, where aid 
concerns basically a transaction between the donor and the recipient government, as in most 
of the theoretical aid literature, there is an additional argument in favor of this specification: 
each country has just one government, independently of its population size, at least as far as 
the country’s international relations are concerned. Hence, insofar as aid is an incentive 
given to the government, it is fitting that it enters the equation without being divided by 
population size. However, of course, population size is probably related to the need to 
intervene felt by the donor, but this does not imply that a linear restriction is warranted ex 
ante, without testing. In fact, we control for population size using a quadratic specification, 
as is common in the literature (see e.g. Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004). This non-linear 
specification captures the idea that although participation in terrorist activity concerns only a 
tiny fraction of the population in any country, this fraction decreases gradually as the 
population of origin increases.  
A first series of checks is presented in table 3. GDP per capita is added to the previous 
three equations, with a view to test whether ODA was not spuriously capturing the effect of 
income on terrorism. Because aid is mainly targeted at poor countries, it is thus natural to 
check that equation 1 is not capturing the effect of low income on terrorism via its correlation 
with ODA. Per capita GDP has a significantly negative coefficient as suggested by common 
sense, in the Poisson regression equation 5. However, it is insignificant in the other two 
equations. As mentioned in the introduction, there are arguments showing that this 
relationship between income and terrorism is not obvious. In particular, Krueger and 
Maleckova (2003) show that the opposite sign is found when they estimate participation 
equations for Hezbollah terrorists, as well as when they present some of their cross-country 
estimates. They conclude that there is little direct connection between poverty, education, 
and participation in terrorist activity. Moreover, their equations suggest that per capita GDP 
may have a significant negative impact in such equations because it is a proxy for civil 
liberties, and not in its own right. There is no need to test for this issue in this paper, which 
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focuses on the effect of ODA. Thus, per capita GDP is simply a fine control variable to have 
in our equations, without putting too much emphasis on its precise interpretation. The 
crucial point that is coming out of table 3 is that its impact, whether it is significant or not, 
does not affect the sign and significance of the impact of ODA on the number of terrorist 
attacks originating from each country. 
 
3. A Suggested Interpretation 
 
 Now, we model a donor that allocates aid between a number of countries, which are 
liable to produce some terrorist attacks against the donor. In each of these countries, the 
government is able to exert some effort for fighting terrorism, at a cost. Then, aid is a way to 
defray the recipient government for this cost of effort. The government’s action exerts its 
influence on the value of a terrorist “hit” for the activists, which also depends on some 
idiosyncratic “militancy” parameter. Hence, for each country, three players are involved: the 
terrorist group determines the number of attacks perpetrated against the donor, the local 
government is exerting some effort to deter these actions, while the donor provides some aid 
for compensating the government. 
 The Model 
 We capture this framework using the following specification. Denote Y the given 
income of the donor, A the total amount of aid delivered, and H the total number of hits 
received from the terrorists coming from the different countries. For each terrorist event, the 
donor is assumed to be able to identify its country of origin with certainty. Assume that the 
donor country incurs a cost ( )Hψ  because of these attacks ( ) ( )( )0",0' >> HH ψψ . Now, 
denote ia  the aid given to country { }ni ,...,1∈ , and ih  the number of attacks originating in i. 
Then, by definition, ∑= i iaA  and ∑= i ihH .  
Country i’s government exerts an effort ie  and incurs in so doing a cost 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0",0', ≥> iii eee ξξξ . Its participation constraint is thus: 
 
 ( ) 0≥−= iii eaU ξ .        (1) 
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 Notice that (1) could encompass the case of the so-called “rogue states”, for whom the 
cost of fighting terrorism is crippling, may be because they share in fact the views of the 
terrorists. Then, ( )ieξ  would be very high. However, a proper treatment of this case would 
possibly have to allow for the use of sanctions, as in Azam and Saadi-Sedik (2004), as well as 
for moral hazard. 
 The terrorist organization from the same country attaches a unit value 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0",0', ≥< iiii evevevθ  to the attacks, where iθ  is the “militancy” parameter, assumed 
known to both the donor and the government, and ( )iev  is the decreasing function that 
captures the negative impact of the government’s effort on the value of the “hit” to the 
terrorist organization. The latter also incurs for perpetrating their attacks a cost 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0",0', >> iii hhh ωωω .  
 The time line of the game is as follows: (i) the donor offers to the government the 
following contract: “I give you ia  if you exert the effort level ie  in fighting the terrorists”; (ii) 
if the contract is accepted, the government exerts the agreed level of effort ie , assumed 
perfectly observable and contractible by the two parties; (iii) the terrorists launch their 
chosen number of attacks ih ; and lastly (iv) the aid is delivered and consumed. Hence, this 
game can be solved by backward induction. We first derive the “hit-supply” curve at the 
level of the terrorist organization. The “attacks supply” curve is then derived at the country 
level, by bringing in the government, and the equilibrium locus across countries is derived 
last.  
 Now, the terrorist organization chooses its level of attacks with a view to maximize: 
 
( ) ( )iiii hhev ωθ − .        (2) 
 
The first-order condition for this problem is: 
 
( ) ( )iii hev 'ωθ = ,         (3) 
from which the following “hit-supply” curve can be derived: 
 
 ( )iii ehh ,θ= ,          (4) 
 15
such that: 
 
 ( )( ) 0" >=∂
∂
i
i
i
i
h
evh
ωθ
 and  ( )( ) 0"
'
<=
∂
∂
i
ii
i
i
h
ev
e
h
ω
θ .     (5) 
 
 The signs of these two partial effects are fairly intuitive, and do not call for much 
comment: more militant groups produce more attacks, while a greater effort by the 
government reduces the number of attacks. 
 The Attacks Supply Curve 
 Now, the donor is seeking to maximize: 
 
 ( )HAY
ia ψ−−max ,        (6) 
 
subject to (1) and (4). This entails first that (1) will be binding in equilibrium as the donor has 
no reason to leave any positive rent to the recipient government. The aid flow just covers the 
cost of effort. This produces a one-to-one relationship between ia  and ie , such that the latter 
is an increasing function of the former, with: 
 
 ( ) 0'
1
>=
ii
i
ead
ed
ξ .        (7) 
 
 Then, solving (6) allows to establish proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1: The number of terrorist attacks originating from country i can be written as 
the following structural equation: 
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such that: 
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Proof: From problem (6), and taking due account of the constraints, the first-order condition 
can be written as: 
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The other derivative comes from (5) above. 
 Proposition 1 assumes that the following second-order condition holds: 
 
 ( )( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) 


−<
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
e
e
ev
ev
ev
ev
h
h
h
h
'
''
'
''
''
''
''
'''
ξ
ξ
ω
ω
ω
ω .     (11) 
 
The latter ensures that the attacks supply curve is convex, yielding an interior 
solution (see figure 1). It requires that the cost function of the terrorist organization does not 
become “too convex”. This holds, for example, with the familiar quadratic cost function. 
Proposition 1 entails that there exists a well-defined structural relation (8) that 
expresses the number of terrorist events as a function of the level of aid granted to the 
government, and of the militancy parameter. Condition (10) entails that aid is effective in this 
model, in that more aid reduces the number of attacks. Moreover, condition (10) implies that 
the slope of the attack-supply curve in the { }ii ah ,  space, which measures the marginal 
impact of aid on the number of attacks, is equalized across countries at the equilibrium point. 
This will be used below for graphical purposes. 
 The Equilibrium Locus 
 Let us now compare the equilibrium outcomes across countries, as we are doing 
implicitly in the cross-country regression exercises performed in the empirical sections 2 
above, and 4 and five below. The main result is captured by proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2: The co-movement of ih  and ia  across all countries traces out a positively 
sloped locus if: 
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Proof: Condition (12) is simply derived by some tedious calculations from the comparative 
statics of the equilibrium point after substituting out iθ .  
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Condition (12) requires that the marginal cost of effort faced by the recipient 
government increases quite sharply, while its impact on the value attached by the terrorists 
to the attacks is relatively weak, or weakening quite sharply with the level of effort. Notice 
how (12) makes condition (11) more stringent. These two conditions imply that the 
effectiveness of the government’s effort at reducing the value of the attacks to the terrorists is 
relatively weak relative to its level. This set of conditions fits a world where terrorists have a 
definite advantage in their fight against the donor and the government. They are facing a 
well exposed target that delegates its protection to relatively inefficient agents. 
 
Figure 1 helps to grasp more intuitively the thrust of the argument developed in this 
section. The indifference curves of two recipient governments are represented by the 
downward sloping convex curves. These represent in fact the attack-supply curves (8) of two 
governments that differ by the degree of militancy that they are facing in their own country. 
The interpretation of these curves as indifference curves comes from the participation 
constraint (1), holding with equality. The upper curve represents the case of a country facing 
a higher level of militancy than the lower curve. Because the slope of these supply curves are 
equalized in equilibrium across countries, as seen above, their tangents at the equilibrium 
points must be parallel. Then, the line linking all such equilibrium points across all the 
ih
ia
( )iH ah ,θ  
Figure 1: Tracing Out the Equilibrium Locus 
( )iL ah ,θ  
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countries is the equilibrium locus described at proposition 2. This equilibrium locus must be 
understood as a partial equilibrium relation, given H. Appendix 2 completes the analysis for 
determining the latter. 
Now, this result is of some help in explaining our empirical results found in the 
previous section if we further assume that the researcher does not know the militancy 
parameter in each country, or omits it for some other reason, and is thus unable to identify 
the structural equation (8). Then, estimating across countries the relationship between the 
number of attacks and the amount of aid given without controlling appropriately for this 
unobservable heterogeneity would simply result in estimating the equilibrium locus 
represented at figure 1. Moreover, in view of (9), the attack-supply curve (8) would be best 
estimated using panel data, even if “militancy” was observed, in order to allow for enough 
variation in H, which is the same for every country at a moment in time. Otherwise, the 
researcher would have to rely on random shocks affecting the aid allocation across countries. 
The Case of Asymmetric Information 
So far, we have assumed that both the donor and the government have the same 
information about the militancy parameter, which they know for sure. In the real world, this 
would probably entail that the governments involved collaborate fully for sharing 
intelligence. In order to underscore the importance of this assumption, we now show that 
asymmetric information does not work in the right direction in this model. In other words, 
we would reach a different conclusion if we assumed that the militancy parameter is the 
southern government’s private information, while the donor only knows a probability 
distribution over this parameter. In order to bring out this point, we simply sketch the 
analysis of the case of two types only, assuming also that the recipient government’s effort 
against terrorism is not observed by the donor. Then, the contract specifies the number of 
attacks perpetrated as a function of the aid level. 
Examination of figure 1 brings out easily the incentive compatibility problem entailed 
by asymmetric information. Remember that the attack-supply curves may be interpreted as 
indifference curves for the recipient governments. The higher up they are in the north-
easterly direction in this space, the higher is their welfare level, because they receive more 
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aid, and exert less effort. Hence, all the recipient governments have an incentive to pretend 
that they are facing very hard nuts to crack, in order to get a more favorable deal from the 
donor. Then, contract theory tells us that the principal should offer to the agent a choice of 
contracts that provides the right incentive for revealing the relevant private information 
(Laffont and Martimort, 2002). The principal is then facing a trade off between rent extraction 
and efficiency, as eliciting the private information often requires a loss of efficiency. 
 
Figure 2: The Case of Asymmetric Information 
 
Here, the analysis is straightforward. Assume that the recipient government knows 
whether the activists that it is facing are of the Lθ  or of the LH θθ >  type, while the donor 
only knows that the H-type occurs with probability π . Then, the latter will present the 
recipient government with the choice to make between two contracts, granting a different 
level of aid in return for a different number of attacks. Figure 2 helps to bring out the 
characteristics of these contracts. 
Notice first that the recipient government’s objective function may be written as: 
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This is a quasi-linear utility function, so that the slope of its indifference curves only 
depends on ih . In other words, a higher level of utility is represented by a rightward shift of 
the indifference curve, without changing the slope.  
Then, figure 2 can be used to determine how the classic rent extraction/efficiency 
trade off is solved in this case. More aid is given to the L-type government, relative to the full 
information equilibrium, thus giving a rent to this type of government. This is illustrated by 
the horizontal shift from point FLE  to point LE . The new welfare level achieved by the L-type 
government is represented by the indifference curve through LE , drawn with a thicker line. 
In order to ensure that this type of government will not choose a contract meant for a H-type 
one, the contract offered to the latter type must not yield a point located above the resulting 
indifference curve. This is avoided by imposing a distortion relative to the full information 
case to the H-type government, by moving to point HE , along the same indifference curve as 
the full-information FHE . Then the menu of contracts represented by { }HL EE ,  is fully 
revealing. Of course, the precise amplitude of the rent given to the L-type and the distortion 
imposed on the H-type depends on their respective probabilities. A larger value of π  will 
induce the donor to reduce the distortion imposed on the H-type, now more probable, and to 
increase the rent left to the L-type, now less probable. This would be represented on figure 2 
by a further rightward shift of the indifference curve drawn with a thicker line. 
The claim made above that asymmetric information does not work in the right 
direction in this model is then easily checked by looking at the diagram. There is a negative 
relationship between aid and the number of attacks across government types, as HE  is 
located to the north-west of LE  in figure 2. It is readily checked that this proposition is quite 
robust, and does not depend too much on the quasi-linear specification. Provided that the 
single-crossing condition holds, and that we rule out “rogue states”, the two equilibrium 
contracts must lie on the same indifference curve of the L-type government, even if the HE   
and LE  equilibria swap their positions along that curve. Hence, the negative slope follows, 
unless we are dealing with a type of “rogue state” that attaches a positive value to the 
attacks. Therefore, the positive impact of ODA found in table 2 suggests that asymmetric 
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information between the donor and the recipient governments about the degree of militancy 
that they are facing is not a useful assumption for understanding this relationship.  
 
4. Testing for Endogeneity 
 The model presented above provides an explanation for the positive relationship 
between the participation in terrorist events of the nationals from a given country and the 
amount of aid received by the latter. It suggests that this relationship should be interpreted 
as an equilibrium locus, akin to an Engel’s curve, linking two endogenous variables for 
different values of some unobserved parameter. Another useful analogy for this equilibrium 
locus would be the equivalent for cross-country data of a co-integration relation, as used in 
time-series analysis. More precisely, the model presented above suggests that this positive 
relationship captures the response of the equilibrium attacks/aid pair to changes in the 
degree of militancy of the potential terrorists. Within the principal-agent framework used 
here, this relationship should not be interpreted as a “terrorist-events” supply curve, but as 
an equilibrium locus that describes the co-movement of these two variables instead. 
Therefore, the estimated equations presented at table 2 are not necessarily immune from an 
endogeneity bias. Within this theoretical framework, we expect all the effects on 
participation linked to militancy to be channeled by the aid variable. However, any other 
random disturbance would also affect both the number of events and the aid variable 
simultaneously. Such co-movements could contaminate the estimate of the aid coefficient, 
thus creating a bias. The aim of this section is to investigate empirically this issue. 
 The present section provides a test for endogeneity bias due to Nakamura and 
Nakamura (1981), which is a version of the Hausman test (see e.g. Maddala, 1989). This 
testing procedure is based on the addition to the equation of the residuals from a reduced 
form equation explaining the suspected variable. Then, these authors have shown that the 
estimated coefficient for this test variable is an estimate of the endogeneity bias. In the case of 
the present model, this testing procedure can be understood easily by using the following 
notation. The model boils down to two simultaneous equations, with a recursive structure. 
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An econometric equation corresponding to the structural attacks supply curve (8) may be 
written as: 
 
 iiii ah εγθβα +−+= .       (14) 
 
 From (10), we know that the aid allocation to each country can be expressed as a 
function of its militancy parameter, and H, which is common to all countries and can thus be 
neglected in a cross-country analysis. Assuming that a linear specification is acceptable, the 
corresponding econometric equation would read: 
 
 iiia νθηδ ++= .        (15) 
 
 The intercepts α and δ subsume in fact all the exogenous control variables that might 
be useful to include in an empirical application of this model. The two error-terms iε  and iν  
are the usual random disturbance terms included in econometric models. In this setting, it is 
quite natural, but not necessary, to assume that they are independently distributed. The 
reason for this judgment is that they capture the errors affecting the behavior of different 
agents. The former one describes the random shocks affecting the national players’ behavior, 
while the latter captures the random disturbances affecting the donor. However, it all 
depends in fact on the common information that these agents are using when making their 
decisions, so that some cross correlation might exist. This is tested in the next section. 
 Then, combining (14) and (15) yields the econometric equivalent of the equilibrium 
locus described at proposition 2 and figure 1. It reads: 
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 If the interpretation offered in the previous section is right, then (16) is what has been 
estimated in section 2, at table 2, omitting to control for militancy. The test proposed in this 
section is to find an estimate for iν , from an empirical equation corresponding to (15), and to 
add it to the equations presented at table 2. A glance at (16) shows that the corresponding 
coefficient will be an estimate of the endogeneity bias ηβ− . 
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Table 4: Reduced-Form ODA Equation (Equation 7) 
 
Variables Coefficient z-Statistics p-value 
Intercept 302.22 7.46 0.000 
Population 5.66 8.74 0.000 
( )2Population  - 0.002 - 2.36 0.018 
GDP p.c. - 0.030 - 6.29 0.000 
China and India - 2295.00 - 3.19 0.001 
West B. & Gaza 273.69 1.16 0.25 
Latin America - 139.51 - 2.60 0.010 
Sub-Saharan - 20.66 - 0.41 0.680 
OECD - 571.62 - 3.08 0.002 
“Camp David” 1683.06 9.89 0.000 
USSR - 148.19 - 2.06 0.039 
ASEAN 179.36 1.56 0.122 
Nb. Obs. 178   
2R  0.74   
Note: This equation has been estimated by a Tobit regression. 
 
In our setting, the test is performed using the residuals from a Tobit regression 
explaining the amount of ODA received by each country. The dependent variable of the 
latter equation is the average amount of ODA received over the period 1990-2001. Because 
our sample includes both developed and developing countries, while only the latter are 
receiving any aid, this dependent variable is truncated at zero. The estimated ODA equation 
is presented in table 4 (equation 7). 
 Equation 7 is a reduced form equation aiming at explaining the average level of ODA 
received by each country, as a function of strictly exogenous variables only. Moreover, from 
our theoretical discussion, we know that we are looking for some political variables liable to 
capture the presence of some militant groups in the recipient country, even if they do so very 
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imperfectly. Hence, beside some economic variables that measure somehow the need for aid, 
such as per capita GDP and population size, we include some more institutional variables. 
Population size is included with a quadratic form, as above. However, even per capita GDP 
is not orthogonal to some political characteristics. For example, Krueger and Maleckova 
(2003) show that it is strongly correlated with the index of civil liberty that they use in their 
equation. This is also true to some extent of the geographical dummy variables that we 
include, for indicating China and India, on the one hand, and Latin America and the 
Caribbean, on the other hand. For example, Huntington (1996) would probably favor an 
interpretation of these variables in terms of the civilizations that prevail in these countries. 
However, the fact that we have lumped together India and China gives this variable a 
definite demographic meaning, rather than one based on civilization. We include also a 
dummy variable for Sub-Saharan Africa, which is not significant, but is useful to have for 
performing the test for endogenity bias below. Notice that both Latin America and Sub-
Saharan Africa have a negative coefficient, suggesting that, given their population size and 
their level of per capita GDP, these continents attract rather less ODA than the others. These 
effects, however, do not seem strongly significant in either case. More surprisingly, we also 
include the dummy variable for the West Bank and Gaza, which turned out insignificant. 
This suggests that the latter is not treated very differently, as far as aid is concerned, from the 
other countries in the Middle East, or Asia beside China and India, or Africa, for that matter.  
The next two variables are definitely political, and might also capture some aspects of 
“militancy” for the indicated countries. There is first a dummy for the countries that joined 
the OECD before 1990, i.e. in fact before 1974. This excludes the countries that joined this 
organization after 1994, which might be deemed to self-select as far as aid is concerned. 
Then, we have included the “Camp David” countries, Egypt and Israel, which are known to 
benefit from a special treatment by the U.S.A., for reasons which are related to the model 
under test. Alesina and Dollar (2000) have also found that these countries benefit from a 
special treatment in the allocation of aid. The last two variables included might help to 
capture some other determinants of aid allocation than geography (civilization?) and 
militancy, and thus help identifying the model. The first one is a dummy indicating the 
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former member countries of the USSR. This is a predetermined variable, which is significant 
with a negative sign. This suggests that these countries have not yet overcome the handicap 
accumulated during the cold war, and are still discriminated against by the aid allocation 
process, during the period covered here. Huntington (1996) would probably favor an 
interpretation of this variable also in terms of civilization, but this would not be very 
convincing. There are almost as many predominantly Muslim countries as there are 
Christian ones in this group, and the latter are far from homogenous, with the Baltic States 
standing apart from the Slav countries, where the Orthodox religion is dominant. Therefore, 
the negative coefficient for this variable suggests that the wake of the cold war matters 
probably to a large extent. The final variable is a dummy for the members of ASEAN having 
joined before 1990. These include the founding countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand), and Brunei, which joined in 1984. This grouping can hardly be 
interpreted as representing a “civilization” effect, in particular because many of the countries 
that Huntington would include in the “Sinic” group are missing here. This variable is 
borderline significant, with a positive sign. May be they were marginally favored by the aid 
allocation process because of their geographical proximity to mainland China, in order to 
keep the latter at bay. We also tried to include the Gini coefficient for each country, assuming 
that income inequality might be a source of militancy. However, this variable turned out 
insignificant. Probably, this says a lot about the quality of the data available regarding this 
variable, and their comparability across countries. Many of the variables kept in the 
specification presented are highly significant. Beside the “Camp David” one, all the more 
political dummy variables seem to be measuring in fact the lack of militancy, as they have all 
a negative coefficient, rather than the opposite. This is immaterial for the purpose at hand, as 
the more militant ones are then the reference countries. Equation 7 is then used for 
computing the residuals and the fitted value used in the equations presented below. 
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Table 5: Test for Endogeneity Bias 
 
 Equation 8   Equation 9   Equation10   
Variables Coefficient z-Statistics p-value Coefficient z-Statistics p-value Coefficient t-Statistics p-value 
Intercept 0.36 2.17 0.030 1.30 32.06 0.000 - 0.64 - 0.17 0.86 
ODA 0.004 8.63 0.000 0.001 20.89 0.000 0.018 1.71 0.09 
Population 0.012 3.74 0.000 0.008 16.77 0.033 0.152 1.77 0.08 
( )2Population - 1.58E-05 - 4.69 0.003 - 6.34E-06 - 16.37 0.000 - 9.96E-05 - 1.36 0.18 
Endog. Bias - 0.003 - 2.57E-03 0.001 - 0.001 - 1.34E-03 0.000 - 0.020 - 1.21 0.23 
Nb. Obs. 178   178   178   
2R  -   -   0.11   
Pseudo- 2R  0.14   0.26   -   
LR-Stat. (4 df) 161.4   1682.4   F-Stat.: 5.25   
p-value 0.000   0.000   0.000   
Note: Equation 8 is a negative binomial regression estimated by quasi-maximum likelihood. Equation 9 is a Poisson regression, estimated by 
maximum likelihood. Equation 10 is a simple OLS regression. The dependent variable is the number of terrorist events originating from each 
country during the period 1990:01-2004:03. 
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 Table 5 presents the results of the test for endogeneity bias announced above. The 
starting point is the equations presented at table 2, to which the residuals from equation 7 
have been added. They turn out to be highly significant in the two equations estimated using 
the integer count methods. These tests are thus rejecting the exogeneity assumption for ODA 
in the terrorist attacks equations presented at table 2. The negative signs of the estimated 
coefficients are in agreement with the prediction that can be derived from (16). Even in the 
OLS equation 10, the same negative sign is found. Notice in addition the estimated 
coefficients at table 5 are very similar to those presented at table 2, suggesting that although 
it is significant, the endogeneity bias is very small in size. 
 
5. An Attempt at Identifying the Attacks Supply Curve 
 
 The test for endogeneity bias performed above suggests that the dummy variables 
used in that exercise contain probably some relevant information for identifying the attacks-
supply curve (8). This section is devoted to investigating this issue. There is no doubt that the 
donor and the recipient governments are using in the real world a much richer information 
set than whatever we can capture by the use of some dummy variables. However, the 
econometric analysis performed in this section suggests that the identification problem can 
be mitigated to a certain extent by such an approach. However, the results must be regarded 
as a first cut at this issue, and simply call for more information gathering. 
For identifying the attacks supply curve, the theoretical model presented at section 3, 
and represented by a linear equation at (14), suggests to include some indicators of the 
degree of “militancy” faced by the recipient government along with the aid flow in the 
equation explaining the number of terrorist attacks emanating from each country. In this 
section, we are looking for a parsimonious equation where ODA comes up with a negative 
sign, consistent with the theoretical framework developed above. Then, the presence of some 
variables unrelated to militancy, and affecting also the aid allocation, as included in equation 
3 above, would be enough for identifying the attacks supply curve. Table 6 presents the 
equations resulting from the addition to those presented at table 3 of two dummy variables, 
one indicating the West Bank and Gaza, and the other one indicating the “Camp David” 
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countries, Egypt and Israel. These two dummy variables are probably the strict minimum 
addition to the estimated equations for capturing “militancy”. On the other hand, these are 
the three countries on earth where the high level of militancy of the terrorist organizations 
cannot be disputed, in view of the frequency of terrorist attacks that we observe performed 
by citizens originating from them.   
 The most important point is that now, ODA comes up with a negative sign, as 
predicted by the theory of section 3, and specified at (14), whichever estimation method is 
used. This suggests that the set of dummy variables added in this equation does capture 
some relevant information about militancy that helps mitigating the identification problem 
raised above. Notice, however, that while several estimated coefficients are very similar 
across equations, with a small number of exceptions, ODA turns out insignificant in the 
Negative Binomial regression. Moreover, a 2χ  test constructed as in section 2 above shows 
that the Poisson restriction is rejected by a wide margin. In other words, the jury is still out, 
as the econometric results presented here are somehow mixed. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
estimated sign for the impact of ODA is negative in the three equations is relatively 
encouraging, as is the fact that it is significant in both the Poisson and the OLS regressions.   
Hence, while the equations presented at table 2 were probably estimating the equilibrium 
locus of the model, the equations presented here are probably closer to a proper estimate of 
the structural attacks supply curve (8). The following exercise provides some clue about how 
close we are from the latter. 
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Table 6: The Attacks Supply Curve 
 
 Equation11   Equation12   Equation13   
Variables Coefficient z-Statistics p-value Coefficient z-Statistics p-value Coefficient t-Statistics p-value 
Intercept 0.90 5.43 0.000 1.33 23.18 0.000 3.33 1.70 0.09 
ODA - 1.96E-04 - 0.44 0.659 - 4.54E-04 - 4.42 0.000 - 0.009 - 1.85 0.066 
Population 0.028 6.91 0.000 0.017 25.09 0.000 0.29 6.78 0.000 
( )2Population - 2.30E-05 - 7.01 0.000 - 1.23E-05 - 20.54 0.000 - 1.75E-04 - 4.87 0.000 
GDP p.c. - 3.62E-05 - 2.94 0.003 - 4.75E-05 - 4.75E-05 0.000 - 3.2E-04 - 2.19 0.030 
West B. Gaza 5.18 5.09 0.000 4.94 68.31 0.000 401.38 24.34 0.000 
“CampDavid” 3.16 3.47 0.001 2.97 12.94 0.000 46.24 3.26 0.001 
Nb. Obs. 178   178   178   
2R  -   -   0.80   
Pseudo- 2R  0.25   0.64   -   
LR-Stat. (6 df) 274.78   4214.31   F-St: 113.92   
p-value 0.000   0.000   0.001   
Note: Equation 11 is a negative binomial regression estimated by quasi-maximum likelihood. Equation 12 is a Poisson regression, estimated by 
maximum likelihood. Equation 13 is a simple OLS regression. The dependent variable is the number of terrorist events originating from each 
country during the period 1990:01-2004:03. 
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Table 7: The Endogeneity Test for the Attacks Supply Curve 
 
 Equation14   Equation15   Equation16   
Variables Coefficient z-Statistics p-value Coefficient z-Statistics p-value Coefficient t-Statistics p-value 
Intercept 1.14 4.37 0.000 1.67 19.43 0.000 10.17 3.16 0.002 
ODA - 0.001 - 1.23 0.219 - 0.001 - 6.54 0.000 - 0.033 - 3.23 0.015 
Population 0.030 6.50 0.000 0.021 18.67 0.000 0.378 7.02 0.000 
( )2Population - 2.39E-05 - 7.08 0.000 - 1.47E-05 - 17.01 0.000 - 2.16E-04 - 5.61 0.000 
GDP p.c. - 4.86E-05 - 2.96 0.003 - 7.14E-05 - 7.14E-05 0.000 - 6.51E-04 - 3.42 0.001 
West B. Gaza 5.41 5.22 0.000 5.19 5.19 0.000 408.28 24.88 0.000 
“CampDavid” 4.49 3.09 0.002 4.67 11.37 0.000 86.41 4.20 0.000 
Endog. Bias 0.001 1.18 0.236 0.001 5.37 0.000 0.033 2.66 0.009 
Nb. Obs. 178   178   178   
2R  -   -   0.81   
Pseudo- 2R  0.25   0.65   -   
LR-Stat. (7 df) 276.18   4245.42   F-St: 102.12   
p-value 0.000   0.000   0.000   
Note: Equation 14 is a negative binomial regression estimated by quasi-maximum likelihood. Equation 15 is a Poisson regression, estimated by 
maximum likelihood. Equation 16 is a simple OLS regression. The dependent variable is the number of terrorist events originating from each 
country during the period 1990:01-2004:03. 
 31
 The equations in table 7 are performing for this supply curve the same test for 
endogeneity bias as the one performed above. It adds to the previous equation the residuals 
from the  reduced-form ODA equation presented at table 4 (equation 7). We find again some 
mixed results. The endogeneity bias is not significant in the Negative Binomial regression, 
with a p-value of 23.6 %, while it is highly significant in the other two equations. Here again, 
then, the jury is still out. A strong suspicion remains that ODA is in fact endogenous in these 
equations. Even in the Negative Binomial equation, the endogeneity bias is not very far from 
significant. However, it seems that the endogeneity problem is quite mild for estimating the 
structural attacks supply curve on this sample.  
Hence, these results are rather comforting for our theoretical framework, although we 
are probably quite far away from using the rich information used by the donors and the 
recipient governments in their fight against terrorism, in the real world. Nevertheless, these 
results suggest that aid is delivered to some extent to recipient countries with a view to 
provide the right incentives for the recipient governments to fight terrorism within their 
sphere of influence. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 We have first found a pretty robust empirical result showing that the supply of 
terrorist activity by any country is positively correlated with the amount of foreign aid 
received by that country. This has been estimated using three estimation methods, including 
the negative binomial, the Poisson, and the OLS regressions over a sample of 178 countries, 
including donors and recipients, as well as source and non source countries for terrorist 
attacks. A mistaken implication of this result would be to conclude that aid should be 
curtailed as part of the overall fight against terrorism. On the contrary, our model suggests 
that aid is delivered by the donor community to some extent as a way of purchasing some 
involvement by the recipient government in this fight. It is precisely because this aid is 
theoretically effective for reducing the supply of terrorist activity that the donor is delivering 
it in our model. However, the comparative statics of this model suggests that countries 
facing more militant activists should be granted more aid, in equilibrium, while they would 
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also be the origin of more terrorist attacks. Hence, the co-movement of aid and terrorism 
originating from the recipient country is simply tracing out an equilibrium locus, and not 
capturing a proper structural equation that could directly be used for making policy 
recommendations. Then, we assume that both the donor and the recipient government 
benefit from an intimate knowledge of the degree of militancy of the activist groups that they 
are facing in the countries concerned, probably based on shared intelligence, which is not 
available to the researcher. It follows that the unobserved heterogeneity across countries is 
what is reflected in the positive relation found between aid and terrorist attacks. Some 
governments get more aid because they face tougher nuts to crack than others.  
 In order to test for this effect, we have used a standard test for endogeneity bias, due 
to Nakamura and Nakamura (1981). The residuals from an estimated reduced-form aid 
equation are used as a test variable in the terrorist attacks equation, and the resulting 
estimate leads to the rejection of the exogeneity assumption. In other words, our finding of a 
positive relation between aid and terrorist attacks is perfectly consistent with a model where 
aid is useful in providing the right incentives for the recipient governments to act effectively 
against terrorism within their sphere of influence. The root cause of the problem is that aid is 
endogenous with respect to terrorist attacks, in the sample used, as the donor chooses the 
pattern of aid allocation across countries taking into account the heterogeneous militancy 
that they are facing. However, in so doing, they use some information that is not available to 
the researcher, whose effect is in fact captured by the aid allocation variable. This analysis 
thus illustrates quite strikingly the general point that economists should be extremely 
cautious before drawing strong policy conclusions from empirical equations, unless the latter 
are derived from a tight analytical framework. Such policy conclusions are only warranted 
after the researcher has ascertained that his results concern a well-identified structural 
equation, and that all endogeneity biases have been corrected appropriately.  
 An admittedly imperfect attempt at identifying the attacks-supply curve has then 
been presented in section 5. Although the dummy variables added to the equation are bound 
to control very coarsely for the missing information on “militancy”, they allow somehow to  
improve the identification of the structural equation governing the supply of attacks from 
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each country, although with some probable imprecision. Now, ODA comes up with the 
negative sign predicted by the theoretical model for this equation. Hence, the model 
presented provides a useful framework for understanding the convergence of the two 
results: an equilibrium locus is found with a positive slope, while the structural equation, 
although probably poorly estimated, comes up with a negative slope. These two equations 
are in fact derived from the same model, and capture two different relations. Despite the 
change in slope, they lead to the same policy conclusion, namely that aid is probably useful 
for fighting terrorism, and is to some extent delivered for that purpose. However, the former 
one is far from being redundant, as it teaches us additionally that (i) aid and the number of 
terrorist attacks per country are simultaneously determined, and (ii) asymmetric information 
is not a useful assumption to make in this case. This suggests that some further research 
would be worthwhile for documenting how far is intelligence shared between the donor and 
recipient countries, and what role is aid playing in this process.  
 We view these results as an invitation to do more work on the use of aid as a means 
to fight terrorism. The main predictions of the theoretical model seem to stand up reasonably 
well against the data, and the fact that a small set of variables is significant in explaining both 
ODA and the number of attacks per source-country is particularly intriguing. Nevertheless, a 
search for better indicators of militancy seems to rank high on the agenda. However, further 
research should also aim at a more direct test, trying to uncover the actual link between aid 
and reduced terrorism. Particularly relevant would be case studies that look at the change in 
counter-terrorist activity, including may be poverty-alleviation policy, undertaken in 
response to a change in the aid flow received. This topic has been neglected in the analytical 
literature so far. Counter-terrorism has been analyzed rather as a matter of retaliation or 
“crack down”. Recent examples of analyses of the latter are found in Bueno de Mesquita 
(2005) and Rosendorff and Sandler (2004). Probably, one of the contributions of the present 
paper is to suggest that both types of anti-terrorism policy approaches, using the carrot and 
the stick, are in fact complementary. It is not the effectiveness of aid at reducing poverty that 
is at stake, but its role as an incentive for recipient governments to act more decisively 
against terrorism. Then, whether the recipient government favors poverty alleviation or 
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“crack down” is a matter of strategy and of policy “ownership”, tailored to the local 
conditions.  
 
Appendix 1: Number of Events per Source Country (1990:01-2004:03) 
 
Country Number Country Number Country Number 
West B. 400 Venezuela 7 Azerbaijan 2 
India 227 Ethiopia 7 China 2 
Colombia 97 Rwanda 7 Bolivia 2 
Israel 58 Yugoslavia 7 Kenya 2 
Iraq 49 Ireland 6 Kuwait 2 
Yemen 49 Italy 6 Chad 2 
Algeria 47 Jordan 6 El Salvador 2 
Pakistan 45 Cambodia 6 Liberia 2 
Angola 41 Japan 5 Macedonia 2 
Russian F. 33 Iran 5 Myanmar 2 
Spain 31 Bangladesh 5 Norway 1 
Turkey 28 Ecuador 5 Sweden 1 
Nigeria 26 U. S. 4 Czech Rep. 1 
Sri Lanka 25 Lebanon 4 Poland 1 
Peru 22 Somalia 4 Croatia 1 
Sierra Leone 21 Bosnia H. 4 Libya 1 
Philippines 19 Sudan 4 Thailand 1 
Egypt 19 Afghanistan 4 Armenia 1 
Tadjikistan 11 Austria 3 Honduras 1 
Indonesia 11 Nepal 3 Eritrea 1 
Greece 11 Netherlands 2 Tanzania 1 
Uganda 10 Switzerland 2 Tunisia 1 
Burundi 10 Germany 2 Morocco 1 
U. K. 9 Argentina 2 Guinea 1 
Saudi Arabia 9 Chile 2 Nicaragua 1 
Georgia 9 Latvia 2 Senegal 1 
South Africa 8 Cuba 2 Emirates 1 
France 7 Malaysia 2 Zambia 1 
Bahrain 7 Panama 2   
Source: ICT (http://www.ict.org.il). 
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Appendix 2: Determination of Equilibrium H. 
  
 Define the world’s aggregate attacks supply curve as: 
 
 ( )∑= i iiiS ahH ,θ .        (A1) 
 
 Then we know from (10) and figure 1 that ia  may be written as a function of iθ  and 
H. It follows that: 
 
 ( ) ( )( )HahHHH iiii iSS ,, θθ∑== .      (A2) 
 
Then, the full equilibrium of the model is a fixed point where HHS = . 
From (10), we know that increasing H would reduce the common slope of all the 
attacks supply curves, entailing an increase in ia  and a fall in ih . Therefore, ( )HHS  is a 
decreasing function. Figure A1 illustrates the determination of the unique equilibrium H. 
 
Figure A1: Determination of Equilibrium H. 
( )HHS  
45 ° 
H 
SH  
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